

David Auger, Pierre Coucheney, Yann Strozecki Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines


Almost Acyclic Simple Stochastic Games

Mardi 17 Décembre, Journées CMF

Simple stochastic game (SSG)

A Simple Stochastic Game (Shapley, Condon) is defined by a directed graph with :


- three sets of vertices V_{MAX} , V_{MIN} , V_{AVE} of outdegree 2
- two (or more) 'sink' vertices with rational values



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
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
Two players : MAX and MIN, and <u>randomness</u>.

- player MAX wants to maximize the value of the sink reached.
- player MIN wants to minimize the value. If no sink is reached, the value is 0.



A play consists in moving a <u>pebble</u> on the graph :


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
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On a AVE node the next vertex is randomly determined.


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


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
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
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Strategies and values

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 σ : partial play ending in $V_{\mathrm{MAX}} \longmapsto$ probability distribution on outneighbours

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 $v(x) = \sup_{\substack{\sigma \text{ strategy} \\ \text{for MAX}}} \inf_{\substack{\tau \text{ strategy} \\ \text{for MIN}}} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\sigma,\tau} \text{ (value of the sink reached | game starts in } x)}_{v_{\sigma,\tau}(x)}$

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Decision problem : v(x) > 0.5?

They generalize important models such as :

- Parity games (model checking of *µ*-calculus)
- Mean payoff games (useful for optimisation)
- Linear programming
- Markov decision process

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
- An example of a problem yet between P and NP
- A simple framework to study stochastic games
- A good model to study partial information



Introduction to Simple Stochastic Games



Fundamental properties of SSGs



Simpler game : Stopping SSGs

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Theorem (Condon 89)

For every SSG G, there is a polynomial-time computable SSG G' such that

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- size of G' = poly(size of G)

• for all vertices x, $v_{G'}(x) > \frac{1}{2}$ if and only if $v_G(x) > \frac{1}{2}$


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To compute values we can restrict our strategies to be


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We call them **positional strategies** for short.



Lemma

Against a positional strategy σ , MIN might as well respond positional :

 $\sigma \text{ positional} \Rightarrow \qquad \inf_{\tau \text{ general}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) = \min_{\tau \text{ positional}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x)$


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Bellman equation characterizes optimality :

$$v^* = \min_{\tau \text{ general}} v_{\sigma,\tau} \Leftrightarrow \forall x, v^*(x) = \begin{cases} \min(v^*(x_1), v^*(x_2)) & \text{if } x \in \text{MIN} \\ \frac{1}{2}(v^*(x_1) + v^*(x_2)) & \text{if } x \in \text{AVE} \\ 0 \text{ or } 1 & \text{if } x \in \text{SINK} \end{cases}$$



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
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
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A solution exists and is unique.

An optimal positional strategy consists in playing optimally at each node wrt to v^* .



Theorem (Condon 89)

For all vertices x,

$$\begin{aligned} v(x) &= \sup_{\sigma \text{ general}} \inf_{\tau \text{ general}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \\ &= \inf_{\tau \text{ general}} \sup_{\sigma \text{ general}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \\ &= \max_{\sigma \text{ positional}} \min_{\tau \text{ positional}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \\ &= \min_{\tau \text{ positional}} \max_{\sigma \text{ positional}} v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \end{aligned}$$

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
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Open question : is the value problem in P?

Fix σ , τ positional strategies.

- if $x \in MAX$, $v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) = v_{\sigma,\tau}(\sigma(x))$
- if $x \in MIN$, $v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) = v_{\sigma,\tau}(\tau(x))$
- if $x \in AVE$, $v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) = \frac{1}{2}v_{\sigma,\tau}(x_1) + \frac{1}{2}v_{\sigma,\tau}(x_2)$
- if $x \in \text{SINK}$, $v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \in [0,1]$




This amounts to solve a linear system.

Fix σ only (best response).

- if $x \in MAX$, $v_{\sigma}(x) = v_{\sigma}(\sigma(x))$
- if $x \in MIN$, $v_{\sigma}(x) \le v_{\sigma}(x_1)$ and $v_{\sigma}(x) \le v_{\sigma}(x_2)$
- if $x \in AVE$, $v_{\sigma}(x) = \frac{1}{2}v_{\sigma}(x_1) + \frac{1}{2}v_{\sigma}(x_2)$
- if $x \in SINK$, $v_{\sigma}(x) \in [0, 1]$
- $\max \sum_{x \in \text{MIN}} v_{\sigma}(x)$


This amounts to solve a linear program.



The switch operation

x is a MIN vertex and $v_{\sigma,\tau}(x) = v_{\sigma,\tau}(x_1) > v_{\sigma,\tau}(x_2)$


switching τ at $x : \tau'(x) = x_2$ and equal to τ elsewhere.



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
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Optimality condition : no switch .

Algorithm to find an optimal strategy against σ : keep switching.

Strategy improvement algorithms

The strategy improvement algorithm a.k.a Hoffman-Karp algorithm (1966, MDP context) is

- choose τ_0 and let $\sigma_0 = \sigma(\tau_0)$ (best response)
- **2** while (σ_k, τ_k) is not optimal, obtain τ_{k+1} by switching τ_k ; let

 $\sigma_{k+1} = \sigma(\tau_{k+1})$

based on :

Lemma

 $v_{\sigma_{k+1},\tau_{k+1}} < v_{\sigma_k,\tau_k}$ as long as (σ_k,τ_k) is not optimal.

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
$$v_{\sigma^*,\tau^*} = \max_{\sigma \text{ pos}} \min_{\tau \text{ pos}} v_{\sigma,\tau} = \min_{\tau \text{ pos}} \max_{\sigma \text{ pos}} v_{\sigma,\tau}$$




Introduction to Simple Stochastic Games




Fundamental properties of SSGs



Solving an acyclic SSG in linear time



Solving an acyclic SSG in linear time



No cycle : compute the values backward from the sinks in time O(n).

Milder form of acyclicity

Max-acyclic game : each MAX vertex has at most one outgoing edge in a cycle.

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Need to compute values $\Rightarrow O(n^4 |V_{MAX}|)$.

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algo for checking A2 :

- solve the acyclic SSG obtained when an arbitrary MAX vertex is fixed to open
- if A2 is true, the next open MAX vertex (say x) is also open in the 1-cycle SSG
- So check it by solving the acyclic SSG forced to be open at *x*.

Based on the previous algo, by opening a vertex next to each fork vertex :

Theorem A k-cycles SSG can be solved in time O(nk!)

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
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To be compared to the strategy improvment algorithm : $O(n^4 2^k)$

There are *k* vertices that, once removed, yields an acyclic SSG.


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


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
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- if value s satisfies the local optimality condition (up to some error bound)

 $s \in [\min(v(x_1), v(x_2)) - \epsilon; \min(v(x_1), v(x_2)) + \epsilon]$

then *s* is close to the real value of *x* in the initial game

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③ otherwise if *s* > min($v(x_1), v(x_2)$) + *e* ⇒ then the value of *x* is less than *s*, go back to 1 with *max* = *s*.

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Theorem

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The method can be used to remove *k* vertices in any SSG and thus makes other classes of SSG tractable.

Tanks for listening!

Questions?